Documenting social and economic effects of ITQs on the West Coast groundfish fishery

About

In January 2011 the West Coast Groundfish fishery transitioned to a multispecies Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) system, a form of catch-shares in which fishers own shares of the total allowable catch for all target species and threatened bycatch species. This fishery presents an interesting example of the weak stock hurdle facing many fisheries around the world: species such as yelloweye and canary rockfish have been historically overfished, and since they grow and reproduce very slowly, they have extremely low annual catch limits which can be exceeded in a single accidental haul. This leaves many individual fishers at a disadvantage compared to larger companies, as they are unable to risk the potential downside of having to purchase additional expensive quota or being forced to stop fishing for the season.

Risk pools are a potential solution to this problem, in which individuals pay to join (and/or contribute their weak stock quota), and then the association pays from the aggregate quota to cover members that accidentally catch weak stock species. Usually membership within a risk pool requires fishermen to agree to actions which would decrease their chance of catching weak stock species, including restrictions to more selective gear and avoiding areas known to have higher densities of weak stock species.

We documented behavioral changes in fishers and the resulting social, environmental, and economic impacts as risk pools emerged in the new IFQ system to learn what changes arose from the transition and to evaluate benefits to fishers resulting from cooperative mechanisms such as risk pools.

Approach

We developed a spatial bioeconomic model to project fisher responses in terms of changes in gear selectivity, spatial distribution of fishing (e.g., to avoid weak stocks), and the adoption of risk pools. We then empirically validated our model and specifically investigated whether: 1) Risk pools successfully reduced the economic and/or ecological problems associated with weak stock bycatch; 2) The new IFQ system created de-facto MPAs through voluntary closures; 3) ITQs caused shifts in fishery landings and quota holdings among communities; and 4) Fishers switched to more selective gears.

Key findings

After implementation of the IFQ system, bycatch declined both overall and as a fraction of trawl catch. Those changes coincided with improvements in the overall abundance of several overfished species: Widow rockfish, canary rockfish, and Petrale sole had all been declared rebuilt by 2015. The first year of revenue data for the program showed that per-vessel revenues in 2011 rose 34 percent, compared with the average of the previous five years.

In terms of fisher behavior, we empirically found that fishers moved away from MPA boundaries when IFQs were introduced, effectively creating areas of voluntary partial closure that extended beyond the official boundaries of MPAs. In addition, a comparison of pre- and post-IFQ trawl durations confirms that trawl tows become shorter in duration and that catch shifted toward fixed-gear after IFQ adoption: a more selective method to reduce bycatch.

Partners

The project was a collaboration with Dr. Robert Deacon at the Property and Environment Research Center Drs. Trevor Branch and Ray Hilborn at the University of Washington, completed with funding fromCalifornia Sea Grant and partners.