2008
Marine reserve effects on fishery profit
White et al. 2008, Ecology Letters
Principal Investigator(s): Christopher Costello, Steve Gaines
Abstract for Marine reserve effects on fishery profit
Some studies suggest that fishery yields can be higher with reserves than under conventional management. However, the economic performance of fisheries depends on economic profit, not fish yield. The predictions of higher yields with reserves rely on intensive fishing pressures between reserves; the exorbitant costs of harvesting low-density populations erode profits. We incorporated this effect into a bioeconomic model to evaluate the economic performance of reserve-based management. Our results indicate that reserves can still benefit fisheries, even those targeting species that are expensive to harvest. However, in contrast to studies focused on yield, only a moderate proportion of the coast in reserves (with moderate harvest pressures outside reserves) is required to maximize profit. Furthermore, reserve area and harvest intensity can be traded off with little impact on profits, allowing for management flexibility while still providing higher profit than attainable under conventional management.
2007
Natural resource use with limited-tenure property rights
Costello et al. 2007, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Principal Investigator(s): Christopher Costello
Abstract for Natural resource use with limited-tenure property rights
We study the dynamic harvest incentives faced by a renewable resource harvester with insecure property rights. A resource “concession” is granted for a fixed duration, after which it is renewed (with a known probability) only if a target stock is achieved. Despite the insecurity of this property right, simple concessions contracts can be designed to induce first best harvest trajectories. We examine how those contracts will depend on economic, ecological, and institutional variables, and apply theoretical insights to two concessions-managed fisheries in Baja California, Mexico.
Fishing the line near marine reserves in single and multispecies fisheries
Kellner et al. 2007, Ecological Applications
Principal Investigator(s): Steve Gaines
Abstract for Fishing the line near marine reserves in single and multispecies fisheries
Throughout the world “fishing the line” is a frequent harvesting tactic in communities where no-take marine reserves are designated. This practice of concentrating fishing effort at the boundary of a marine reserve is predicated upon the principle of spillover, the net export of stock from the marine reserve to the surrounding unprotected waters. We explore the consequences and optimality of fishing the line using a spatially explicit theoretical model. We show that fishing the line: (1) is part of the optimal effort distribution near no-take marine reserves with mobile species regardless of the cooperation level among harvesters; (2) has a significant impact on the spatial patterns of catch per unit effort (CPUE) and fish density both within and outside of the reserve; and (3) can enhance total population size and catch simultaneously under a limited set of conditions for overexploited populations. Additionally, we explore the consequences of basing the spatial distribution of fishing effort for a multispecies fishery upon the optimality of the most mobile species that exhibits the greatest spillover. Our results show that the intensity of effort allocated to fishing the line should instead be based upon more intermediate rates of mobility within the targeted community. We conclude with a comparison between model predictions and empirical findings from a density gradient study of two important game fish in the vicinity of a no-take marine-life refuge on Santa Catalina Island, California (USA). These results reveal the need for empirical studies to account for harvester behavior and suggest that the implications of spatial discontinuities such as fishing the line should be incorporated into marine-reserve design.
Temperature control of larval dispersal and the implications for marine ecology, evolution, and conservation
O'Connor et al. 2007, PNAS
Principal Investigator(s): Steve Gaines
Abstract for Temperature control of larval dispersal and the implications for marine ecology, evolution, and conservation
Temperature controls the rate of fundamental biochemical processes and thereby regulates organismal attributes including development rate and survival. The increase in metabolic rate with temperature explains substantial among-species variation in life-history traits, population dynamics, and ecosystem processes. Temperature can also cause variability in metabolic rate within species. Here, we compare the effect of temperature on a key component of marine life cycles among a geographically and taxonomically diverse group of marine fish and invertebrates. Although innumerable lab studies document the negative effect of temperature on larval development time, little is known about the generality versus taxon-dependence of this relationship. We present a unified, parameterized model for the temperature dependence of larval development in marine animals. Because the duration of the larval period is known to influence larval dispersal distance and survival, changes in ocean temperature could have a direct and predictable influence on population connectivity, community structure, and regional-to-global scale patterns of biodiversity.
The efficiency gains from fully delineating rights in an ITQ fishery
Costello et al. 2007, Marine Resource Economics
Principal Investigator(s): Christopher Costello
Abstract for The efficiency gains from fully delineating rights in an ITQ fishery
Individual transferable quota (ITQ) regulation relies on a decentralized market mechanism and a single price to allocate access to a stock of fish. The resulting allocation will not be fully efficient if the stock being allocated is heterogeneous or if there are potential gains from centralized coordination of harvesting effort. If stocks are heterogeneous in their density, location, or unit value during the season, harvesters governed by an ITQ policy will not be indifferent to when or where they exercise their quotas. Stocks that are relatively dense and/or close to port will be preferred to those less dense or more remote. Because an ITQ policy assigns the same opportunity cost for each unit harvested, individual harvesters have an incentive to compete for higher-valued units, and such competition may dissipate part of the fishery's potential rent. A similar phenomenon arises when stock densities vary in an unknown way over space or time, so harvesters must engage in costly search. Individual harvesters governed by an ITQ policy still face a collective action problem which limits the incentive to share information on stock locations. This can lead to redundant search effort. We demonstrate that both sources of inefficiency can be eliminated either by defining ITQ rights more precisely or by an agreement among harvesters to coordinate their effort. We develop models that illustrate these effects and identify the factors that determine their likely size. Anecdotal evidence on practices adopted by fishery cooperatives is presented to illustrate the practical relevance of the issues we raise.